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PROSPECTS IN GERMANY

In a few weeks a conference on Germany will be held in Geneva.

It will

be a conference of the foreign ministers of the Western nations and the Soviet
Union.

Free Germans of the West and Communist Germans of the East will be present.

This Conference is likely to be followed by another in the summer--a conference
of President Eisenhower and other Western heads of state and Mr. Khrushchev.
We may expect that these two principal conferences will be supplemented
by a great deal of diplomatic exchange and other contacts at all levels and in
various combinations.
munist nations.

There will be meetings among representatives of the com-

There will be meetings among representatives of the free nations.

There will be meetings between the free and the communist.

In short, we are in

for talk, a great deal of talk in the days ahead.

Procedures and the Coming Conferences
We may anticipate that there \-rill be disagreements--serious disagreements--even before the stage of negotiating the problems of peace is reached.
There will be arguments over who should talk and who should not; whether talk
should begin at the summit and echo down to the base or begin at the base and
rise up to the summit.
place.

Same of these arguments, indeed, have already taken

There will be others.
Let me say that I appreciate the importance of these preliminaries.

The manner in which they are dealt with will have an effect on the prospects
for peace.

It is important that procedural questions be discussed :f'ul1y.

It

is equally important, however, that they be discussed with one object in view-the facilitating of sound agreements for peace.

Procedural questions are not or
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ought not to be wrangled over for the purposes of face-saving, propaganda or the
evasion of responsibilities.
questions are important.

Let us recognize, by all means, that procedural

But let us recognize, too, that the basic

problem which confronts us is not who talks with whom and when.

procedura~

Rather, it is:

What kind of talk is likely to produce meaningful agreement?
I believe it is reasonable to say that decent men and women--in Russia
or in Poland no less than in the United States or the United Kingdom are not interested in propaganda conferences or face-saving conferences.

The¥ are not in-

terested in conferences which merely restate platitudes on the virtues of peace.
They are interested in conferences which will get on with the business of peacemaking.

They will expect of those who participate in these conferences less con-

cern with the problem of saving face and more with the problem of saving civilization.

They will pray for the success of these conferences wherever they meet,

whoever may participate in them, whenever they are held.

Object of the Coming Conferences
When we speak of praying for the success of these conferences, we ought
to have clearly in mind some concept of what we mean by success.

Do we mean the

kind of success which characterized the Geneva Conference in 1955?

That con-

ference produced pleasant generalizations on the virtues of peace.

A year later,

however, we were back to business as usual, to the business of propaganda war and
cold war.
peace.

Now, four years after Geneva, we are without tangible achievements for

On the contrary, we are entering the most critical period in international

relations since the Korean conflict.
Nor can we mean, when we pray for the success of these impending conferences, peace at any price.

I do not believe the people of this nation are

prepared to sacrifice the future of their children in freedom for a .moment of
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surcease from the pressures and tensions of life today on the brink of war.
No, I do not think we mean either of these alternatives when we say that
we pray for the success of these conferences.

I believe that we mean we hope for

progress towards sensible agreements which will permit us to live and to let live,
which will substitute competition in the realm of ideas and human achievement for
competition on the battlefields, which will reduce the dangers of hostility among
nations now staring at each other across the black and bottomless pit of nuclear
war.

In short, we hope for agreements which promise some measure of stability

for all mankind.

We hope for agreements which will reduce the likelihood of armed

conflict not only for today but for tomorrow and tomorrow.

We hope for agreements

which at least will begin to remove the residual injustices of vlorld War II and
its chaotic aftermath--injustices which, almost fifteen years later, still press
upon the backs of the peoples of many lands.
It is one thing to hope, in these terms, for the success of the coming
conferences.

It will be another to bring the hope to fruition.

In international

aspirations as in human aspirations, there is, inevitably, a gap between what we
would like to do and what we are likely to be able to do.
The best chance of closing this gap, I believe, lies in approaching the
impending conference with neither an excess of expectation nor with a cynical
disbelief in their prospects of yielding anything constructive.

l'iha.t we need

most in the days and weeks of talk which lie ahead is a clear and a specific
understanding of what it is that we want to bring about by these talks.

We need

a positive purpose which is adjusted to the realities of the existing situation
in the world.

We need ideas, new ideas, realistic ideas, which may help us to

realize this purpose.

It is important to remember in this connection that in the

realm of international negotiation, the search for all is like1y to yield nothing.
The intelligent pursuit of what is reasonable tnay lead to more than we dared hope
for.

- 4 The Need for the Conferences
Before we can clarify our purposes in the impending conferences, it is
essential to appreciate the origins of these conferences.

Why, we may well ask

ourselves, is it necessary to talk with the Russians at all at this time, about
Germany or any other subject for that matter?
West to meet?

Has Mr. Khrushchev compelled the

Are we merely responding, reluctantly, reticently, to a changing

whim in Soviet policy?

Are we going into these conferences as though they were

some evil communist brew which we have no choice but to drink?
If that is our concept, if we see the origins of the conferences in
these terms then I say, in all seriousness, that it is preferable not to go into
them.

We do not have to drink of the cup that is preferred.

If we can conceive

of our participation in these conferences as nothing more than a submission to
Soviet threats or an entrapment by Soviet blandishments then I say again it is
better not to go into them; it is better, not to delude ourselves.
Seen in these terms, the Conferences will yield nothing worth the having.

They may produce propaganda.

faces.

They will

~

They may produce platitudes.

They may save

produce a worthwhile basis for durable peace in Germany and

Europe or anywhere else.

On the contrary, they .may rot even further the shabby

platform which now supports the present dangerous international dance on the edge
of destruction.
I want to suggest, however, that we need not appraise these coming conferences as merely a Western jump to the snap of the Soviet diplomatic whip.
There is another way of looking at them.

Some of us have looked at them in this

other fashion for a long time, long before Mr. Khrushchev's recent manoeuvres at
Berlin.

In this other lignt, the origins of these conferences are seen to lie in

very different soil.

Seen in this other lignt, the need for these talks, is a

need that has long existed.

For some of us who have advocated an American ini-

tiative for peace, it is a source of regret that we of the West have appeared

- 5to wait for a prompting from the East to begin these talks.
For us, the origins of these talks do not rest in Mr. Khrushchev's
recent statements.

The need arises elsewhere.

It arises from the vast changes

which have taken place in the world during the past decade; more particularly
the changes which have taken place on the European continent; specifically, the
changes which have taken place in Germany.
Let me point out some of these changes.
monumental revolution in technology alone.

Think for a moment of the

In scarcely a decade, this technolog-

ical revolution has reposed in the hands of men, at once, the power to light new
stars in the heavens and to put out the lightS of civilization on earth.

That

change alone has a profound significance for all humanity and endless implications for the foreign policies of every nation.
There have been other changes of not much less significance.

We have

witnessed in Russia in the space of a decade the passing of the era of Stalin;
the recovery from the devastation of invasion and the rapid development of an
advanced science and technology.

We have witnessed, during this decade, vast

upheavals within China and great transitions in the belt of nations--old nations
and new--stretching half way round the world, from one end of the Afro-Asian

world to the other.
ancient moorings.

A billion and a half people have been torn loose from
These changes, too, have a profound significance for us, for

the Russians, for the entire world.
In Europe, we have witnessed the comeback of a continent.

Its people,

in the vlest, at least, are no longer the stunned, war-numbed masses, which the
liberating allied armies found wandering in bewildered impotence, in the midst
of the rubble and overwhelming devastation of

~lorld

War II.

The Europeans have

revitalized themselves, their economies, their political life.
all Western Europe is emphatically true of Western Germany.
has recovered.

vlhat is true of

An old generation

A new generation has come of age, charged with new vigour, new

ideas, seeking nevr and constructive directions.
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Can we suppose for a moment that these changes--these vast, unmeasurable changes and others do not compel changes in the relationships among nations?
It is obvious that they do; they alter the facts of the situation with which the
policies of this nation, of all nations must deal if there is to be peace.
Obvious1y, policies devised years ago, in another setting, cannot serve in the
new situation which is evolving.
It is true that there have been some adjustments in the policies of
all the principal nations to these changes.

The

~uestion

justments sufficient; are they coming in good time?

is:

are these ad-

Unless they are, not only

is there little likelihood of a genuine peace being achieved but even the un?Poken truces which have, heretofore, cushioned the principal points of friction
in the world, are endangered.

In the light of the world-wide transition of the

past decade these unstable truces must either be altered by reason, by negotiation, sufficiently and in time, or, sooner or later, they will give way in conflict.
One of these points of friction, of possible conflict, exists in
Germany.

In fact, it extends throughout Central Europe.

It is in this region

that the military power ·of the two nations capable of ultimate war--the United
States and the Soviet Union--are in the closest of contact.

It is in this

region, too, that most of the residual injustices of World War II are to be
found.
For years now an unspoken agreement, an unstable truce has existed in
this region.

The shaky peace has rested on the avoidance of military incidents

which go beyond the point of no return.

It has rested on the

ac~uiescence

of

the Germans, no less than the Western Powers and the Soviet Union in a divided
Germany and a divided Berlin.

It has rested upon the

ac~uiescence

of ourselves

and the peoples of Eastern Europe in Soviet military domination of that region.

- 7For years this has been the reality, despite talk of unification of
Germany, despite talk of liberation of Eastern Europe, despite Soviet threats and
blandishments.
It has been a tolerable, if not, exactly, a comfortable arrangement.
What we have failed to reckon with, however, or at least to reckon with adequately,
is that the pressures of change in the world and, particularly 1 in Europe and
Germany itself, have been building around this point whether we have realized it
or not, whether or not we and the Russians chose to look at this reality.
waited a long time to face this fact.

We have

I deeply hope that we are prepared to face

it now and that it is not too late to face it now, in peace.
This, then, is the perspective in which the coming conferences ought to
be seen.

I repeat they may be worse than useless if they are regarded merely as

an unavoidable Western response to a Soviet initiative.

They can be a God-send if

they are recognized by all concerned as an opportunity to begin to replace the outmoded truce in Germany and Central Europe with something more

du~able,

something

better for all concerned.
If the beginnings of a stable peace in Germany and Centra,l Europe are to
be drawn !rom the impending Conferences, there will have to be a rethi'll;:::T.ng of

many aspects of the policies which the Soviet Union has pursued in that region,
which the nations of the West have pursued.

There will have to be give and take,

a quid pro quo, concession to match concession.

We cannot, at this point, see the

details of agreements but the signposts along the road to a rational settlement
are beginning to emerge.
1.

At Berlin, for example, we can see that there can be no one-

sided withdrawal of the forces of freedom from the Western part of the city.

That

does not mean, however, that there can be no change in the status of that city.
It means only that any change in the status of that city must be a total change,
which leaves freedom in no less an advantageous position

than communism.

Perhaps

- 8 this total change can be brought about through the interim neutralization of both
free and communist Berlin with the help of the United Nations and under its supervision, with free access to the city by all routes guaranteed by that body until
Berlin becomes once again the capitol of a United Germany.
2.

There needs to be at least the beginnings of the beginning on

the problem of German unification, with Germans of East and West contributing more,
much more, than they now are doing to the solution of the problems of unification.

3· There must be same evidence of a willingness on the part of the
communists in control of the Eastern part of Germany to accept and to extend the
principles of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights.

In particular,

there must be a beginning of the restoration of political rights to all in that
zone, rights which can be exercised freel y and not under the threat of terror.

4. There must be a willingness to accept the reality that
Germany's peaceful ties with Western Europe cannot be ended except by the will of
the German people themselves.

5.

There must be an equal willingness, however, to accept the

premise that the extent and nature of German rearmament is not sacrosanc t , that
it can be limited or altered in the interests of the security of all

6. There must be a willingness to accept the premise

n8.t ~-:::ns.

tba~

the

numbers of foreign troops, and the nature of their armaments in Germany aud in
Central Europe is subject to negotiation on a give and take basis.

To this end,

the Eden and Gaitskill plans and the Rapacki Plan all merit the closest consideration, provided, I repeat, provided that there are reasonable agreements in the
Geneva Conferences on the control of nuclear testing and the prevention of surprise attack.
May I say that the points which I have just enumerated are not new.
Others have alluded to them.

I believe that in part at least they represent the

direction in which the Secretary of State was trying to lead the Western nations
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when he was stricken.

I reiterate tonight what I have said many times, that his

illness represents a most serious loss to the cause of freedom and of peace and
that I hope deeply that he will recover in time to make his advice, his leadership, and his guidance available.
May I say, too, that the points which I have just enumerated as signposts of peace are drawn from the same nine points which I made in a speech in
the Senate two months ago and have repeated in whole or in part on several occasions since that time.

I have not altered those points in any significant way

because I believed then and I believe now that they indicate the way in which the
search for a more durable peace--a worthwhile peace--is like1y to prove most
fruitful.

The discussion which has followed my remarks in the Senate and else-

where has been very useful.

It has helped to clarify and to elaborate.

Most of

all, it has helped, I believe, to break the moratorium on new thougnt on this
critical problem of the nation.

This thought in connection with the German Crisis

is coming before, not as in Korea, after the crisis was upon us.

Strengthening the Prospects for Peace
Let me consider, in conclusion, the prospects for peace in Germany and
what can be done to strengthen them.

I think it is essential to emphasize that

peace in Germany depends not· on us alone, not on the Western nations alone but on
the Soviet Union as well.
not be peace.

If the Soviet Union does not seek peace then there will

It ,d oes not follow, however, that even if the Soviet Union does

seek a durable settlement in Germany and Central Europe that one will automatically emerge.

Peace is a two-way street and we are on one side of it.

We will endanger our own position and the prospects of peace if we become obsessed with the fascinating game of interpreting the ever-changing charades
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of Soviet policy.

These charades may mean peace.

mean neither peace nor war.

They .may mean war.

They may

We can only assume as certainty that at any given

time they can mean any of these possibilities and that we must be prepared to face
any of them.

What we can do, beyond this, if we would increase the prospects of

peace, is to get clear in our own minds why it is that we stand firm in Germany,
as indeed we must.

We stand firm, not as an end in itself.

order to go forward towards a durable peace.

We stand firm in

If there is to be peace, we 7 no less

than the Russians, shall have to put aside the dangerous toys of the propaganda
war, and the chips on the shoulders of the cold war.
both the grins and the frowns.

We shall have to put aside

We shall have to examine and to examine deeply

the problems of peace and see what it is possible to do with them in the light of
the new realities of the situation which confronts us.
these altered problems, new ideas.

We shall have to apply to

We shall have to bring to these problems a

renewed determination to respond to the deepest desire of our own people and of
all mankind, a new dedication to the search for progress towards a durable

peac~.

I

